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HEARINGS BUORE mE SENATE COIlllERCE COJIIIITTEE
SUBCOIIKITTBB ON COlIIIOHlCATIONS
HELD SEPTBllBER 1S, 1989
~ ~ BVOLU'l'IOB OF DISTRESS SALES:
(A Direct Benefi.t to NOD-Ilinorities

ORAL TESTDlONY OP

J. CLAY SKITS, JR.
ON BEHALF OF RATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION!I

INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to be here today before the Senate
Subcommittee on Communications to discuss the state of minqrity
ownership of broadcast facilities as relates to recent actions by
the FCC and the court.

A public discussion of this topic is

quite timely in light of recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit of
the

u.s.

Court of Appeals dealing directly with the validity of

FCC's minority enhancement policies and its distress sale
I'

~/

National Bar Association was founded in 1925, and is an
organization comprised of Black lawyers across the United
States. The National Bar Association has, for the last
forty years, actively participated in the formation of the
nation's telecommunications policy. J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
Esq. is currently a Professor of Law at Boward .University
School of Law in Washington, D.C. In preparing his oral
testimony, Professor Smith was assisted by Err¢ll D. Brown,
Esq., currently an associate at O'Malley, Miles and Harrell
in Landover, Maryland, Cynthia Mabry, Esq., currently an
associate at Crowell and Moring in Washington, D.C., and
Lisa C. Wilson, Esq., currently an associate at Fisher,
Wayland, Cooper and Leader in Washington, ·D.C. All views
expressed are those of the authors and of the National Bar
Association, and do not express the views of the authors'
respective employers.
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Because of the D.C. Circuit's recent decision to

invalidate the distress saTe policy on equal protection grounds,
these comments will focus specifically on this policy alone.~1
It is

gen~rally

settled that an agency's decision not to

prosecute or to exercise its administrative enforcement authority
is a matter of agency discretion.

The Supreme Court itself has

recognized the ngeneral unsuitability for judicial review of
agency decisions to refuse enforcement."

u.s.

821, 831 (1985).

Heckler v. Chaney, 470

For example, the Commission is vested with

the power to grant a broadcast license without a hearing if it is
able to make the finding that to do so results in lithe more
efficient use of the broadcast spectrum."

Absent specific

guidelines to determine a precise definition on the "efficient
use of the broadcast spectrum," the Commission is left to its own
devices on how to pursue its public interest mandate.
In'''May, 1978, the Commission issued a "Policy Statement on

II

See, Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 88-1755
(D.C. Cir. April 21, 1989) (held, awarding qualitative
enhancement credit to broadcast applicants that have
minority ownership does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Fifth Amendment) 1 Shurberq Broadcasting of
Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, No. 84-1600 (D.C. eire ~rch 31,
1989) (held, distress sale policy violates Fif~h Amendment
because program not narrowly tailored to reme~y past
discrimination or to promote program diversity).

II

For a legal analysis of the Commission's minority and gender
enhancement policies, see Wilson, "Minority and Gender
Enhancements: A Necessary and Valid Means to Achieve
Diversity in the Broadcast Marketplace," 40 Fed. Comm. L.J.
89 (1988).
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Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities."J,./

In issuing the

Policy Statement, the Commission exercised its administrative
enforcement discretion by introducing a measure whereby non./

minority

licen~ees,

who were either facing a revocation hearing

or who have had issues designated against their renewal
application significant enough to warrant a hearing, could opt to
sell their stations rather than run the risk of engaging in the
hearing where they could be stripped of their license altogether.
This policy is referred to as the "distress sale policy."
The distress sale policy as adopted in 1978 was not unique
....

because since at least 1966, the Commission had authorized the
assignment of licenses in some instances where there were
outstanding issues involving the qualifications of the licensee.
Assignments such as these were and are now permitted in
circumstances where the licensee is either bankrupt, or
physica.l:ly or mentally disabled.

In other words, prior to the

distress sale policy, the FCC entertained a "Petition for Special
Relief" permitting a licensee in violation of its rules to sell
its station without invoking the FCC's revocation procedures.

In

sum, in exceptional circumstances the Commission has exercised
its enforcement powers to avoid revocation hearings by Petitions
for Special Relief, or by its distress sale policy.
The distress sale policy of the FCC has recently come under
scrutiny based on constitutional concerns that this policy

J./

See, Policy Statement, 42 RR 2d 1689 (1978) ("Policy
Statement") .
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discriminates against non-minorities.
of discrimination are inconclusive.

We think that such claims
We further believe that the

focus on distress sale cases should, indeed, must be on the
benefit, if

an~~

to the non-minority licensee prior to and after

the implementation of the distress sale policy.
The distress sale policy grew out of a dual recognition by
the FCC that it could affect greater diversity in the marketplace
through a distress sale policy tied to its enforcement authority.
This mixed objective was thought to be well within the public
interest mandate prescribed by Congress in 1934 when the
Communications Act was adopted.

Under the distress sale pOlicy,

the public interest was intended to be served by aiding minority
entrance into the marketplace and to ease the burden of the exit
of non-minorities by sparing them from the death penalty -- the
revocation of their license.
He~ce,

from its inception, one of the dual objectives of the

distress sale policy was to provide direct relief to nonminorities.

Now, how did this policy directly aid non-

minorities?

The policy allowed the non-minority to exit his/her

existing broadcast business without a costly hearing and
permitted the non-minority licensee to salvage 75% or less of
fair market value in the sale of their broadcast property.

This

was an economically beneficial policy for non-minorities because
it permitted them to avoid administrative costs by bypassing a
revocation hearing and by being able to reap a profit of up to
75% or less of fair market value.

In fact, non-minorities
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affirmatively sought and gained a clarification from FCC to make
the application of the distress sale policy retroactive.

A copy

of the Clarification of Distress Sale Policy (FCC 78-725), and
the FCC News

Re~ease,

both dated October 11, 1978, are submitted

for the record of these proceedings.
For those who would argue that the distress sale policy is
not significant because only 38 licenses have been assigned since
1978 pursuant to the policy, this fact may be reflective of the
Commission's failure to execute its enforcement authority as it
pertains to designating licenses for hearing at renewal time.
In creating another exception to the rule that assignment
applications not be granted when there are unresolved
qualifications issues against the licensee, the FCC has not
created a constitutionally impermissible criteria based on race,
rather it has created an enforcement tool that benefits
minorit~'s

and non-minorities.

Therefore, it is

~perative

we consider why Shurberg might be wrongly decided.

that

The pro-

majority enforcement policy must be taken into account in an
analysis of Shurberg.

In granting the assignment of licenses

without a hearing on the unresolved qualifications issues, the
Commission essentially conceived a remedy to what they apparently
viewed as a problem that needed solving.

The Commission's

enforcement discretion was clearly articulated in tpe Policy
Statement, where the Commission stated:
" ..• in order to further encourage broadcasters to seek
out minority purchasers, we will permit licensees whose
licenses have been designated for revocation hearing,
or whose renewal applications have been pesignated for

I.
~.

.
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hearing on basic qualifications issues, but before the
hearing is initiated, to transfer or assign their
licenses at a "di~tress sale" price ••• "
Policy Statement at 1695.
The

distre~s

I

sale policy is constitutionally permissible

because it benetits minorities and non-minorities equally.

